Russian intelligence services are actively analyzing data from the Chinese messaging app WeChat to identify individuals who may be communicating with Chinese intelligence operatives, according to a document obtained by The New York Times. The document, attributed to Russia’s domestic security agency, the Federal Security Service (FSB), outlines how the agency is leveraging WeChat data for counterintelligence operations.
The document highlights WeChat as a particular focus of interest for the FSB, stating that it processes detailed user information, including account logins, contact lists, and archived messages. Some of this data is reportedly obtained directly from mobile phones confiscated from individuals under investigation by Russian authorities.
According to the FSB, the data is processed using an automated system referred to as “Skopishche,” a tool described as capable of conducting extensive data analysis. The system reportedly helps map relationships and interactions among WeChat users to detect links with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) intelligence services. The document refers to Skopishche as being used in “search activities,” a term commonly associated with surveillance and intelligence gathering.
FSB officers are instructed to forward WeChat user information—such as account details, contact logs, and chat histories—to a dedicated China-focused counterintelligence unit. The data is then further examined using another tool called “Laretz,” which the document describes as capable of analyzing “more than a thousand electronic indicators simultaneously.”
While the extent of the FSB’s interception capabilities regarding WeChat remains unclear, one Western intelligence agency told The Times that the report aligns with known efforts by Russia to penetrate Chinese communication platforms.
WeChat, owned by Chinese tech giant Tencent, is one of the world’s most widely used social and messaging apps, with over 1.4 billion users globally. The app combines messaging, mobile payments, social networking, and access to various services. Despite its scale, it lacks end-to-end encryption, making it more vulnerable to surveillance than apps like Signal or WhatsApp.
Although WeChat introduced some limited encryption features in 2016, experts such as Mona Wang of the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab argue the platform’s security still falls short of other encrypted services. Analysts note that while it seems unlikely that Chinese intelligence would rely on such a platform for sensitive communication, potential informants or recruits may not realize they are engaging with intelligence personnel.
Russia had briefly banned WeChat in 2017, but the service was reinstated after Tencent complied with regulations requiring large digital platforms to register as “organizers of information dissemination.” This registration obliges companies to store user data locally and provide access to Russian authorities upon request.
Tencent and both the FSB and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond to requests for comment.
The document offers a rare look into how two authoritarian regimes with a shared interest in surveillance are also wary of each other’s espionage activities, despite outward displays of strategic partnership.
